

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

INTEGRATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN PHASE ZERO OPERATIONS

by

Richard E. McGlamory, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: LTC Kyle L. Feger

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2010

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Abstract

Current realities in the realm of US foreign policy will ultimately lead to the downsizing and decreased relevance of Geographic Combatant Commands unless they are able to redefine their contribution to phase zero activities. Only by outsourcing their personnel to the Department of State and US embassies for the difficult task of phase zero shaping operations will the Department of Defense retain the current command structures that have become the “golden ring” for US Four-Star Generals.

Radical change may be necessary to usher the United States to the next level of integration between the Departments of Defense and State. As it currently stands, the Department of Defense ultimately shoulders the lion’s share of the load for phase zero operations, while phase zero is arguably more of a State Department mission. Since the Defense Department is exerting the majority of the effort, why not use Department of Defense people and money to influence phase zero operations through the Department of State?

Contents

Disclaimer	i
Abstract	ii
Contents	iii
Introduction	1
Thesis	3
Research Question	3
Phase Zero	4
Mission of the Department of State	7
Concerns with Shaping	8
A Call for Change	11
Recommendations for the Department of Defense	14
Conclusion	18
Notes	20
Bibliography	22

If we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad.¹

—Robert Gates
Secretary of Defense

To begin this discussion of US national security policy, there are some assumptions that must be identified. The United States can do things better. The Department of Defense is not the only answer to the question of national security. There are many ideas already published that attempt to answer this question, or at least shed light on the issue. There is not an epiphany waiting to be brought into the world by a policy genius that provides “the answer.” As the most robustly funded security entity, the Department of Defense can help shape the debate.

Introduction

Current realities in the realm of US foreign policy will ultimately lead to the downsizing and decreased relevance of Geographic Combatant commands unless they are able to redefine their contribution to phase zero activities. Only by outsourcing their personnel to the Department of State and US embassies for the difficult task of phase zero shaping operations will the Department of Defense retain the relevance of the current command structures that have become the “golden ring” for US Four-Star Generals.

This research will examine the possibility of change within the Department of Defense to accomplish phase zero activities. The first step is to define phase zero operations by reviewing past publications and current Joint Publications. This review will reveal that while phase zero is defined, there is no published guidance addressing how to accomplish the difficult task of

shaping operations. Even without specified guidance, there are entire combatant commands with enormous staffs dedicated to almost entirely phase zero activities.

The Department of State is also tasked with shaping responsibilities. Congress even created an entity within the Department of State deemed the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). While Congress created the office, it has only provided minimal funding and has called upon the Department of Defense to share portions of its budget with the S/CRS.

Although both the Department of Defense and Department of State are tasked with shaping activities, there are critics of the idea. Some claim that the Geographic Combatant Commanders have too much power and that their preeminence in foreign diplomacy leads to the militarization of US foreign policy. Critics are also concerned that the military dominance in foreign policy detracts from a whole of government approach. There are also critics that claim that there is no place for shaping activities for either department or that the military should continue in the primary role of shaping.

The many problems with the current policy of shaping has led to the call for review and proposed changes to the current system. The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) is one group focused on improving national security. The PNSR has recommended changes and made very strong statements regarding national security that cannot be ignored by current leadership. Changes call for the reorganization of defense spending and the entire reorganization of the national security apparatus through a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency.

Finally, this research will make recommendations for the Department of Defense to implement changes that will result in a more relevant GCC and improved National Security. The Department of Defense should first emphasize its primary role as the nation's war fighter.

Following that affirmation, the DOD can then identify its role in shaping activities, including providing funds to the S/CRS. Finally, the Department of Defense can guarantee its continued relevance by providing personnel to the S/CRS and embassies to augment the State Department's efforts in foreign policy. This apparent contradiction is the only way the Department of Defense will remain relevant in phase zero activities.

Thesis

Current realities in the realm of US foreign policy will ultimately lead to the downsizing and decreased relevance of Geographic Combatant Commands unless they are able to redefine their contribution to phase zero activities. Only by outsourcing their personnel to the Department of State and US embassies for the difficult task of phase zero shaping operations will the Department of Defense retain the current command structures that have become the "golden ring" for US Four-Star Generals.

Research Question

What if the DOD were to (in concert with the DOS) identify the personnel necessary to accomplish phase zero activities, and assign those people to the DOS? If congress will not fund and equip the DOS to do the phase zero activities then DOD can train and equip personnel under DOS supervision/guidelines then deploy the personnel to operate under the DOS. This allows the DOS to gain/maintain the responsibility for phase zero, augmented by DOD until Congress can fund the DOS to accomplish the mission. Can the Geographic Combatant Commander actually become more relevant in the future of national security by ceding some of its responsibilities for phase zero activities to the Department of State and Embassies?

Phase Zero

Radical change may be necessary to usher the United States to the next level of integration between the Departments of Defense and State. As it currently stands, the Department of Defense ultimately shoulders the lion's share of the load for phase zero operations, while phase zero is arguably more of a State Department mission. Since the Defense Department is exerting the majority of the effort, why not use Department of Defense people and money to influence phase zero operations through the Department of State?

The first step in this research is to define phase zero. In 2006, General Charles Wald, the Deputy Commander of U.S. European command discussed phase zero in the Joint Forces Quarterly. He states “[t]he traditional four phases of a military campaign identified in joint publications are deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Phase Zero encompasses all activities prior to the beginning of Phase I—that is, everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place.”² General Wald continues by stating that “the primary goal of Phase Zero is to invest fewer resources in a pre-crisis situation to avoid an exponentially larger expenditure later.”³

General Wald and USEUCOM refrained from taking credit for originating the concept of Phase Zero, but maintained that the concept was a central element of its theater strategy.⁴ With a focus on phase zero USEUCOM's goal was to “sustain phase zero engagements with no transition to subsequent conflict...[making] it more appropriate to describe Phase Zero as a campaign in and of itself—a new kind of campaign that must be fought continuously by U.S. joint forces in concert with the interagency community and in cooperation with allies and partner nations.”⁵ From this genesis, phase zero has continued to evolve.

Currently, there are six distinct phases defined in Joint Publications, from phase zero to phase five. Joint Publication 5-0 (JP5-0) defines a phase as “a definitive stage of an operation or

campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.”⁶ JP5-0 further explains that phasing is a way to arrange operations and “that it assists commanders in systematically achieving objectives that cannot be achieved concurrently by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence.”⁷ The Joint Publication then depicts a figure that details one phase that is distinctly different than all other phases. *Figure IV-8 Notional Operational Plan Phases JP5-0, IV-34*




Figure IV-8. Notional Operation Plan Phases

8

(It is important to note the left scale of the figure, “Level of Military Effort.” By its own admission, the military places less effort in phase zero operations than the other phases.)

Phase zero is now known as the Shaping Phase and, as depicted in the figure above, encompasses global shaping, theater shaping, and operational shaping. JP5-0 defines shaping as “joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and

various interagency activities [that] are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure of solidify relationships with friends and allies. [Shaping activities] are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives.”⁹ The Joint Publication continues to explain that phase zero activities occur in the context of day-to-day operations and as such are beyond the scope of JP5-0.¹⁰

There is, in fact, no Joint Publication that addresses how to accomplish phase zero planning. The classified Joint Strategic Cooperation Plan (JSCP) mandates GCCs to accomplish phase zero planning. Phase zero operations are normally outlined in the GCC’s classified security cooperation plans (SCP). Some Geographic Combatant Commands are rightly focused on phases other than phase zero. CENTCOM is obviously engaged in other phases of operation in its conduct of OIF and OEF. Nonetheless, some commands, such as AFRICOM are primarily focused on phase zero, shaping activities.

This focus on phase zero activities yields staffs of thousands of personnel that are dedicated to planning and overseeing shaping activities. For example, AFRICOM has a staff of approximately 1300 personnel with the expressed mission of: “in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.”¹¹ As of the spring 2009 posture statement, AFRICOM has 27 interagency personnel assigned to the command.¹² The commander touts the importance of this interagency involvement stating “we multiply effects and achieve greater results when we work closely with our USG interagency partners. Having interagency personnel imbedded in our command enhances our

planning and coordination....”¹³ The Department of State also has a mission that is similar to the DOD’s phase zero.

Mission of the Department of State

The mission statement of the Department of State is “advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world...”¹⁴ That mission was further refined in July 2004 when Congress authorized the creation of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).¹⁵ The S/CRS was established as a response to a perceived need within the Executive Branch, Congress, and independent experts for the US Government to develop a more robust capability to prevent conflict when possible.¹⁶ The S/CRS mission is “to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.”¹⁷

While the S/CRS is the office which has the mission that corresponds to the DOD’s phase zero mission, it does not have the resources available to the DOD. S/CRS began operations in July 2004 and by early 2005 had a staff of 37 individuals.¹⁸ The S/CRS continued to grow and as of January 2009, had a staff of 112. Of the 112 personnel, only a little over half were State Department personnel, with other executive branch agencies and contractors making up the remainder.¹⁹ The Department of Defense made up four of the positions with personnel from the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers, and Air Force.

Although the S/CRS had a moderate start, it has continued to receive funding and continues to grow. Until 2008, the S/CRS received the majority of its funding through congressionally approved transfers from the DOD. “In September 2008, Congress passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act. This legislation codified the existence and functions of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and authorized new operational capabilities within the State Department, a Civilian Response Corps of government employees with an active and standby component, and a Civilian Reserve Corps.”²⁰

President Obama sees the relevance of the office and has requested funding to grow not only the S/CRS, but also a Civilian Response Corps (CRC). “The Obama Administration requested \$323.3 million in FY2010 funds to continue developing the CRC active and standby component...and to establish a 2,000 member civilian reserve component.”²¹ Nonetheless, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees both completely eliminated funding for the CRC reserve component in their 2010 bills.²²

Concerns with Shaping

There are critics of both the military and civilian components of the US government being involved with phase zero and shaping activities. The opponents of the military involvement claim that the activities: create a Combatant Commander with too much power, lead to the militarization of US foreign policy, and do not lead to a whole of government approach. The critics of the S/CRS involvement with shaping state that there is no need for shaping activities or that, if it is accomplished, it should be done by the military.

The Geographic Combatant Commander is one of the most powerful US government representatives in the realm of foreign policy. While an Ambassador is the spokesperson for the president in their assigned country, the GCC is responsible for many countries. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory discussed this phenomenon in its Final Report of the Joint Urban Warrior 2009 Exercise. The Final Report notes that “in the U.S. diplomatic community, authority lies with the ambassador, who operates at the country level, while in the U.S. military it is vested at the regional level with the combatant commander. This creates a mismatch of authority with DOD operating at the regional level and State operating at the country level.”²³

With the addition of phase zero activities, designed to build relationships and build capacities, the GCC became more powerful, leading to the militarization of foreign policy. Richard Kohn describes the rise of the military in foreign relations. “While foreign policy in the Clinton Administration in the 1990s focused upon economic relationships with the rest of the world, an increasing portion of diplomacy and bilateral relationships...were absorbed by the military, specifically by the regional commanders responsible for defense planning and security relationships around the world. Military-to-military exchanges, personal contacts, cooperative training missions, and joint and combined exercises increased so dramatically that on some of the most important political and alliance issues, the military displaced other government agencies as the chief tool of American foreign relations.”²⁴

The GCC as the chief tool of American foreign relations is not the only problem critics see with the military phase zero operations. Many see an imbalance between civilian and military capacity in foreign relations. Ideally, the civilian sector would take the lead in foreign policy, or at the least, the responsibility would be shared equally. Nonetheless, the Congressional Research Service notes that “some argue that the highly unequal allocation of

resources between the Departments of Defense, State and USAID, hinder their ability to act as “equal partners” and could lead to the militarization of development and diplomacy.”²⁵ The Joint Urban Warrior Final Report pinpoints the imbalance stating “the [US government] is drastically unbalanced with respect to military/civilian ratios (210:1 in personnel, 350:1 in budget).”²⁶

There are also critics of the S/CRS being involved in shaping activities. The first critical view is that shaping activities are unnecessary and potentially detrimental. Nina Serafino of the Congressional Research Service quotes two think-tank studies that “dispute the concept that weak and failing states are per se among the most significant threats to the United States. They point out that weak states are not the only locations where terrorists have found recruits or sought safe-haven as they have exploited discontent and operated in developed countries as well.”²⁷ There are many other factors that contribute to terrorism. A report of the Center for Global Development suggests that “demographic, political, religious, cultural, and geographic [factors] contribute to the development of terrorism.”²⁸ This focus on shaping activities in weak and failing states may actually be detrimental. Ms. Serafino suggests that the “emphasis on weak and failing states can lead the United States to give short shrift to more tangible threats and to areas of greater U.S. interest.”²⁹

Critics of S/CRS also claim that shaping activities are best addressed by the military. As previously discussed, the military has many more personnel at its disposal for such activities. The Department of Defense is also more adequately funded, transferring its own budget resources to the Department of State to keep the S/CRS afloat. Critics also look to post World War II Germany and Japan as success stories for military involvement in weak states. However,

Ms. Serafino highlights that “the success stories (Germany and Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because of several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere.”³⁰

A Call for Change

Many leaders in the US government are concerned with the current muddling approach to foreign policy. In reality, it is intuitively inappropriate for the military, which is charged with conducting war as its main foreign policy purpose, to be the branch of the government to lead peacetime shaping operations. This intuitive conundrum led to the formation of a group of leading defense and policy professionals charged with recommending a way ahead for the US government. The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) was formed as a result of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 calling for a “study of the national security interagency system by an independent, non-profit, nonpartisan organization.”³¹

The PNSR is a non-partisan project led by “James R. Locher III, a principal architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that modernized the joint military system.”³² It is made up of over 300 members, with some notable members being Wes Clark, Ken Weinstein, Brent Scowcroft, and Newt Gingrich. The project published *Forging a New Shield*, a 742 page document with the expressed purpose to “provide a comprehensive historical analysis of the current U.S. national security system, an evaluation of the system’s performance since its inception in 1947, and a detailed analysis of its current capabilities.”³³ Among other things, the report “highlights the compelling case for redesigning the U.S. national security system.”³⁴

The PNSR recommends drastic changes in the national security system. As a result of the recommendations being so drastic, change will likely be slow and opposed by many. Nonetheless, the recommendations cannot be ignored and change will occur. The PNSR’s

Forging a New Shield proposes “such a bold reform in this report; if implemented, it would constitute the most farreaching (sic) governmental design innovation in national security since the passage of the National Security Act in 1947.”³⁵

The PNSR is resolute in its belief that the current system must be reformed, highlighting failures from pre-Vietnam to today. “Clearly, U.S. national security apparatus failed at many integrative challenges before the Vietnam War, and it failed at many such challenges after Vietnam. It is troubled still, as current dilemmas attest. After more than seven years, the U.S. government has proved unable to integrate adequately the military and nonmilitary dimensions of a complex war on terror, or to effectively integrate hard and soft power in Iraq. It has faced the same challenge in Afghanistan, where it has also had trouble integrating allied contributions into an effective strategy.... It is our unshakable conviction that the United States simply cannot afford the failure rate that the current national security system is not only prone but virtually guaranteed to cause.”³⁶ Such strong words will not be ignored or taken lightly by political leaders.

This strong call for massive change in the national security apparatus will ultimately lead to a change in the Department of Defense. The most obvious change will be in the defense budget. As more agencies are integrated into the national security system, the DOD will see a resultant decrease in its budget. The Department will also see a reduction in authority to carry out diplomacy based shaping operations, possibly leading to an elimination of phase zero from its realm of responsibility.

As previously discussed, the DOD has a budget 350 times the size of the State Department. With entire combatant commands dedicated to phase zero operations, if those responsibilities are shifted to the DOS, the DOD budget will drastically decrease. What is at

risk—“a new concept of national security demands recalibration of how we think about and manage national security resources and budgeting. Today’s more complex challenges impose qualitatively more demanding resource allocation choices, even in good economic times. If we should face a period of protracted austerity in government, as now seems more likely than not, meeting those challenges will become orders of magnitude more difficult. In developing and implementing national security policy, the rubber meets the road where money is spent, and we are unanimously agreed that the current system’s gross inefficiencies risk collapse under the weight of the protracted budget pressures that likely lie ahead. We need to do more with less, but we cannot hope to achieve even that without fundamental reform of the resource management function.”³⁷

To address the aforementioned budgetary issues, the PNSR has bold recommendations that would affect the entire security budgeting process. “We recommend the creation of *an integrated national security budget* to provide the president and the Congress a government-wide understanding of activities, priorities, and resource allocation, and to identify redundancies and deficiencies in the resourcing of national security missions.”³⁸ Such a change would relegate the Department of Defense to one of many agencies vying for defense dollars. There is hardly a prediction that would lean toward this type of change resulting in an increased DOD budget. It is much more likely this type of change would lead to a substantively decreased budget.

The PNSR recommends a change in the national security system that is comparable to that experienced by the DOD with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The Marine Corps Joint Urban Warrior makes a similar claim stating “the PNSR recommendations echo some of [Joint Urban Warrior’s] main themes, including the implementation of a Goldwater-Nichols Act to reform U.S. interagency operations....”³⁹ Surprisingly; senior Defense officials have made

similar claims. In 2004, then vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, “suggested a Goldwater-Nichols act for all of the federal government to improve the way the country responds to terrorism.”⁴⁰ This type of change would most likely lead to a decreased DOD authority to carry out the primarily diplomatic mission of shaping operations, as this mission would have an interagency focus with the State Department in the lead.

The reorganization of the national security apparatus is not the only challenge to the DOD continuing its phase zero mission. Senior military officials recognize the growing reluctance by many countries to invite the US military to conduct operations within their borders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognizes this stating “[d]iminishing overseas access is another challenge anticipated in the future operating environment. Foreign sensitivities to U.S. military presence have steadily been increasing. Even close allies may be hesitant to grant access for a variety of reasons.”⁴¹ Obviously, the mission of shaping operations within failed or failing states would be impaired or completely impeded without access to the countries.

Recommendations for the Department of Defense

First and foremost, I think it’s important that we don’t militarize our foreign policy. That would be a tremendous mistake. The State Department must do diplomacy, [USAID] must do development, Defense must do Defense.⁴²

*Adm. James Stavridis,
Commander of U.S. Southern Command*

The first step in moving ahead for the Department of Defense is to recognize its proper role in policy. The role of the military in US Policy is clearly defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Admiral Mullen defines that role. “The fundamental purpose of military power is to deter or wage war in support of national

policy. In these capacities, military power is a coercive instrument, designed to achieve by force or the threat of force what other means cannot. While it may be employed in more benign ways for a variety of important purposes across a wide range of situations, these other uses should not be allowed to imperil its ultimate ability to wage war.”⁴³ Thus, the military recognizes that its primary role is to fight the nation’s wars.

With the proper mission defined, the next step is to identify the DOD’s role in the soft power application of engagement and shaping activities. The Chairman addresses this also. “Combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction must all be competencies of the joint force. While some special-purpose forces will specialize in particular aspects of one or more, general-purpose forces must be able to operate in all four types of activity in one way or another. Currently, U.S. joint forces possess codified doctrine for the conduct of combat, but doctrine and capabilities with respect to the other activities are less robust. That imbalance must change. That said, it is important to keep in mind that while other agencies can perform security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction, only the military can conduct combat.”⁴⁴ The Chairman recognizes there is a mission for the DOD in phase zero, but exactly what that mission is and how to accomplish it is not defined.

There are laws that govern how the Department of Defense can spend its allocated budget. “Fiscal law requires that Government agencies spend their budgets only for the purposes for which Congress has appropriated the money. It is a violation of law (31 USC 1301(a) “purpose statute”) for the DOD to use its appropriation for anything other than what is stated in the appropriation. In other words, money given to the DOD for national defense may not be used for another purpose.”⁴⁵ Since Congress has granted DOD the authority through 1207 or

1210 to fund S/CRS, it is not a violation for the DOD to support the DOS. Some relevant examples are contained in the following table. Examples of DOD funding to S/CRS:

Country	Project's Purpose	FY (Amount \$ mill)
Lebanon	Help train and outfit additional Lebanese Internal Security Force members (i.e., Lebanon's national police) to allow police to free Lebanese Army forces performing policing duties in the Bekaa Valley to enforce the Israeli-Hezbollah cease-fire in southern Lebanon	FY 06 (5.0)
Lebanon	Strengthen ISF communications capacity and assist the ISF in introducing community and proximity policing in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp and surrounding areas	FY 08 (10.0)
Tajikistan	Provide training and technical assistance to local government, local law enforcement representatives, and community leaders to enhance skills to promote stability in conflict-affected and unstable areas, including the Ferghana and Rasht Valleys and the Afghan border areas	FY 07 (9.9)
Yemen	Promote stability by assisting in areas where the central government is largely absent in order to deter youths from joining terrorist groups	FY 07 (8.5)

Data from CRS Report for Congress⁴⁶

However, Congress is not satisfied with the extent of DOD's involvement in the S/CRS. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) issued a statement following Secretary Gate's testimony regarding the DOD's contribution to the S/CRS. "In its report accompanying S. 3001 (S. Rept 110-335), SASC stated that DOD had "inappropriately restricted the uses for which services or funds may be provided to the Department of State under section 1207...." Pointing to the Secretary of Defense's April 15, 2008, testimony at a HASC hearing that Section 1207 authority "is primarily for bringing civilian expertise to operate alongside or in place of our armed forces," SASC stated that the legislative intent of section 1207 authority was broader, and was meant "to enable the Secretary of Defense to support the provision by the Secretary of State of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country." SASC further stated such assistance could include "providing early civilian resources to avert a crisis that could otherwise subsequently require U.S. military forces to assist or intervene."⁴⁷

The Department of Defense should immediately take advantage of this congressional call for greater involvement. While it may be counterintuitive for the DOD to increase its involvement in the DOS, it could be the key to the DOD's continued relevance in phase zero... and more importantly for the DOD continued budget allocation. As previously discussed, the DOD receives the lion's share of shaping dollars, but Congress wants to see more DOD involvement in S/CRS activities. The solution to this dilemma is for the DOD to not only allocate budget resources, but also allocate personnel.

The robust Combatant Commands that are primarily responsible for phase zero activities have staffs of over 1,000 personnel. The DOD could substantially increase the staff, and thus the ability, of the S/CRS by deploying/attaching/exchanging a small portion of its phase zero staffs. The DOD could deploy or exchange its military members to the S/CRS. Nonetheless, the DOD personnel would not have to be military members in uniform, but could be civilians hired with the expressed intent of augmenting the DOS. Through this move, the DOD would continue to show the need for personnel, and thus justify its budget, but would also show increased willingness to assist with the interagency solution for the shaping conundrum.

The next step would be for the Defense Department to further their involvement by implementing the same type of program to augment the country teams of each Embassy. The Chairman recognizes the importance of the country team in engagement activities. In the CCJO, he makes this clear. "Even more than other categories of joint activity, engagement is subject to a myriad of laws and regulations governing everything from limits on funding and the deployment of military personnel to legislative restrictions on the tasks to which military assistance may be applied. Given these complexities, nothing can compensate for close and continuous interagency coordination at the individual country level. The key to that coordination

is the country team and the U.S. Ambassador to whom it answers. As the permanent agent of the U.S. government's diplomatic relationship with the host nation, the country team alone can negotiate the access essential to effective engagement. And as the President's personal representative, only the ambassador has the authority to insure synchronization of interagency operations. Above all, by virtue of its routine political contacts with the host government and its familiarity with local conditions, the country team is uniquely placed to assess the partner nation's ability and willingness to accept military engagement and, where those differ from the U.S. appraisal, to convince the host government to modify its views. For all these reasons, the country team will be the coordinating authority in most engagement efforts, and the success of those efforts will depend on the effectiveness of the liaison between and among the regional combatant command and the country teams in its area of responsibility.”⁴⁸

The Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5105.75 discusses the “policy and responsibilities for the operation of DOD elements at U.S. embassies.”⁴⁹ The DODD does not restrict the number of DOD personnel that can operate in U.S. embassies. It does create “the position of Senior Defense Official (SDO) as the principal DOD official in U.S. embassies”, and as such the SDO is “the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.”⁵⁰ Thus the framework for DOD personnel to operate as part of the embassy is already in place. The important next step is to convince the Ambassadors that the additional DOD personnel would substantially increase their ability to affect national security policy in their assigned country.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense can redefine its contribution to phase zero activities. By outsourcing their personnel to the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and US embassies,

Geographic Combatant Commands can remain relevant and possibly retain their budgets. This research attempted to prove this thesis by first defining phase zero. The next step was to define the similar mission of the Department of State S/CRS. Following this was a review of the concerns with shaping operations in general, both for the DOD and DOS. Next by reviewing calls for change in the US security apparatus the research set the stage for recommendations for the DOD. Finally this research recommended changes for the Department of Defense that will help it remain relevant in the future of phase zero operations and possibly even lead to a more secure United States.

Notes

-
- ¹ PNSR—Turning Ideas into Action, 2009, 30.
 - ² Wald, 2006, 72.
 - ³ Wald, 2006, 73.
 - ⁴ Wald, 2006, 73.
 - ⁵ Wald, 2006, 75.
 - ⁶ JP5-0, 2006, IV-32.
 - ⁷ JP5-0, 2006, IV-33.
 - ⁸ JP5-0, 2006, IV-34, figure IV-8.
 - ⁹ JP5-0, 2006, IV-35.
 - ¹⁰ JP5-0, 2006, IV-35.
 - ¹¹ AFRICOM Factsheet, 2008.
 - ¹² AFRICOM Posture Statement, 2009, 20.
 - ¹³ AFRICOM Posture Statement, 2009, 37.
 - ¹⁴ DOS Mission Statement, 2009.
 - ¹⁵ S/CRS Mission Statement.
 - ¹⁶ S/CRS Mission Statement.
 - ¹⁷ S/CRS Mission Statement.
 - ¹⁸ Serafino, 2009, 9.
 - ¹⁹ Serafino, 2009, 13.
 - ²⁰ Serafino, 2009, Summary.
 - ²¹ Serafino, 2009, Summary.
 - ²² Serafino, 2009, Summary.
 - ²³ Joint Urban Warrior, 2009, 17.
 - ²⁴ Kohn, 2009.
 - ²⁵ Ploch, 2009, 6.
 - ²⁶ Joint Urban Warrior, 2009, 12.
 - ²⁷ Serafino, 2009, 6.
 - ²⁸ Serafino, 2009, 6.
 - ²⁹ Serafino, 2009, 6.
 - ³⁰ Serafino, 2009, 7.
 - ³¹ PNSR—Forging a New Shield, 2008, Letter to President, 4 of 742.
 - ³² PNSR—Forging a New Shield, 2008, 6 of 742.
 - ³³ PNSR—Forging a New Shield, 2008, Precis, 25 of 742.
 - ³⁴ PNSR—Forging a New Shield, 2008, Precis, 25 of 742.
 - ³⁵ PNSR—Forging a New Shield, 2008, Exsum, i, 26 of 742.
 - ³⁶ PNSR—Forging a New Shield, 2008, Exsum iii, 28 of 742.
 - ³⁷ PNSR—Forging a New Shield, 2008, Exsum v, 30 of 742.
 - ³⁸ PNSR—Forging a New Shield, 2008, Exsum xi, 36 of 742.
 - ³⁹ Joint Urban Warrior, 2009, 18.

-
- ⁴⁰ Garamone, 2004.
⁴¹ CCJO v3, 2009, 6.
⁴² Stavridis, 2009.
⁴³ CCJO v3, 2009, 1.
⁴⁴ CCJO v3, 2009, 21.
⁴⁵ Byrnes.
⁴⁶ Serafino DOD Section 1207, 2008, 6.
⁴⁷ Serafino DOD Section 1207, 2008, 5.
⁴⁸ CCJO v3, 2009, 17.
⁴⁹ DODD 5105.75, 2007, 1.
⁵⁰ DODD 5105.75, 2007, 2.

Bibliography

- Byrnes, Major Bradford B., "U.S. Military Support to International Humanitarian Relief Operations Legal/Fiscal Limits and Constraints," *Liaison online*, volume IV Issue 1 www.coe-dmha.org/Liaison/Vol_4No_1/Dept03.htm , accessed 19 Feb 2010.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) Version 3. 15 Jan 2009.
- Department of Defense Directive 5105.75, "Department of Defense Operations at U.S. Embassies," 21 Dec 2007.
- Garamone, Jim. "Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act," American Forces Press Service, 7 September 2004, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25384> , accessed 19 Feb 2010.
- Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning*, 26 December 2006.
- Joint Urban Warrior 2009—Final Report, Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 16 September 2009.
- Kohn, Richard H. "The Danger of Militarization in an Endless "War" on Terrorism," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 73, No. 1, January 2009.
- Office of the Coordinator for reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), "Mission Statement," <http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QXJ> , accessed 19 Feb 2010.
- Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," Congressional Research Service, 2 October 2009.
- Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), *Forging a New Shield*, Center for the Study of the Presidency, November, 2008.
- Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), *Turning Ideas Into Action*, Center for the Study of the Presidency, September 2009.
- Serafino, Nina M. "Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet." Congressional Research Service, 25 Nov 2008.
- Serafino, Nina M. "Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities," Congressional Research Service, July 23, 2009, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32862_20090723.pdf , accessed 19 Feb 2010.

Stavridis, Admiral James. "Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee," 18 Mar 2009, <http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/factFiles.php?id=99> , accessed 18 Feb 2010.

United States Department of State, "Department Mission Statement," <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm>.

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), "Fact Sheet," 18 Oct 2008, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644> , accessed 19 Feb 2010.

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), "Statement of General William E. Ward, USA, Commander, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee," 17-18 Mar 2009.

Wald, Charles F. *Phase Zero Operations*, Joint Forces Quarterly 4th Quarter 2006 issue 43, NDU Press.